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NATURE OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Hardy appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for an extraordinary 
writ pursuant to rule 65B(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He claims that the Board 
relied on incorrect information in its 1986 parole hearing. Therefore, he asserts 
constitutional entitlement to a new parole hearing at which he would be able to personally 
appear. This Court has appellate jurisdiction by virtue of the Utah Supreme Court's 
pour-over authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1999) 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Since the facts set forth in the exhibits to Hardy's petition, accepted as true, 
themselves showed that he could not establish a claim for relief, did the trial court 
correctly decide that it could dismiss the petition under rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? When reviewing dismissal of a petition for an extraordinary writ, this Court 
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accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah 1997). 
2. When Hardy had already admitted to the Board that he had escaped from 
the Utah State Prison and committed a felony in California while on escape status, did the 
later expungement of two prison disciplinaries arising from that escape require the Board, 
as a matter of due process, to give Hardy a new, in-person, parole hearing? When 
reviewing dismissal of a petition for an extraordinary writ, this Court accords no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Padilla, 947 P.2d 664. Further, this Court 
only reviews the fairness of the process before the board, not its substantive parole release 
decision. Id. 
3. Since the procedural due process protections set forth in Labrum v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913 (Utah 1993) were made effective on a prospective 
basis only, is Hardy, who was originally heard by the parole board in 1986, entitled to 
them. This legal question is subject to de novo review for correctness. Padilla, 947 P.2d 
664. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Statutory and constitutional provisions relevant to this case are cited in the text. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hardy became subject to the Board's jurisdiction in September 1979 when he was 
sentenced to a life term at the Utah State Prison for first-degree murder (R. 294). Less 
than two years after beginning his Utah sentence, however, Hardy escaped from the Utah 
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prison and went to California where he promptly committed aggravated assault (id.). 
After conviction for that crime, he resided in a California prison until February 1986 (id. 
at 288). He then returned to the Utah and began to serve the balance of his Utah sentence 
(id.). 
After a few continuances, the Board held an original parole grant hearing on 
September 24, 1986 (id.).1 Exhibits to Hardy's petition showed that notice of that hearing 
was mailed on September 17, 1986 (id.). In a partial transcript of the September 24 
hearing, which is attached to Hardy's petition, he admits to the Board that he "left" the 
prison: "I won't admit to an escape but I'll admit that I left. I didn't leave in that [sic] 
manner of what they said" (R. 49). Hardy also admitted to having committed three 
disciplinary violations while in the California prison system, including assault on another 
inmate (id.). 
Board member Frances Palacios then questioned Hardy in more detail regarding 
the escape. 
PALACIOS: I just have one question Mr. Hardy. Um, you, it 
goes to the escape. You have no new conviction, you have no 
disciplinary convictions that I can see or acknowledge, but at 
the same time we have what I think you are acknowledging 
and that is a prima facie case of escape. You were in custody, 
1
 The Board initially was to convene its hearing on September 9, 1986. 
Notice of that hearing was given by a letter dated August 4, 1986 (R. 25). On August 12, 
1986, the Board sent Hardy a letter advising him that the date for the hearing was 
changed to September 10, 1986 (R. 27). On September 10, however, the Board informed 
Hardy that his hearing would again be postponed until the full Board could attend (R. 45, 
46). The Board sent Hardy a letter on September 17, 1986 telling him that the hearing 
would be held on September 24. Hardy denies receiving the letter (R. 39). 
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you had no legal order to be out of custody, and you ended up 
out of custody. 
HARDY: Yes. 
PALACIOS: Now, we have a report, a rather detailed report 
that tells us about all of the things that you did. That's the 
only information we have. If you would have us believe that 
Scotty beamed you outside those prison walls, that's fine. But 
if you would prepare, to present to us an explanation of how 
you got outside the walls, I'd be happy to hear it. Otherwise, 
all I have is the report that I've got. 
HARDY: No, I'd rather not comment. 
(R. 56). Later on in the hearing, Board Member Dennis Fuchs expressed his concern, not 
just with the escape, but with Hardy's then committing a crime substantially similar to the 
one for which he was originally sentenced in Utah (id.). At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Board chairman announced a parole release date of September 14, 2004 (id. at 58). 
On August 24, 1990, to settle a case filed in the United States District Court for 
Utah, Central Division, the Utah Department of Corrections agreed to expunge two 
disciplinary convictions that were on Hardy's prison record (id. at 67). These had to do 
with the 1981 escape. As part of that settlement, the Department also agreed to notify the 
Board that the disciplinary proceedings had been expunged (id. 68). This was done via a 
letter dated November 1, 1991 (id. at 71).2 
This letter is to inform you that per an Order signed by the 
Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Federal District Court Judge, the 
inmate disciplinary report nos. 2620 and 2681 have been 
expunged from the USP records of inmate Edward Dale 
Hardy, USP No. 14736. 
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On September 7, 1993, Hardy sent a letter to the Board requesting that it "please 
amend in light of the expungement, it's [sic] previous decision of September 24, 1986 
regarding my release" (id. at 74, emphasis in original). In December of that year, the 
Board considered Hardy's request in a "special attention review," a meeting of Board 
members where they review new information and decide whether a parole decision 
should be changed. The Board decided not to change the parole release date, keeping it at 
September 2004 (id. at 162). A month later, Hardy challenged this decision in a letter to 
the Board in which he stated that he had not requested a "special attention review," but a 
"new and second hearing to nullify the old, and mistakenly conducted first hearing" (id. at 
79). 
On May 6, 1996, the Board responded to a letter it had received from Hardy's 
attorney that requested reconsideration and rehearing due to the expungement. Board 
chairman Michael R. Sibbett, acting on behalf of the Board, denied the request. 
The Board has thoroughly reviewed the document, in which 
you provided legal counsel, and finds nothing in it to warrant 
reconsideration of Mr. Hardy's case or the granting of a 
shorter parole date. 
Even disregarding the disciplinary reports surrounding the 
1981 escape, which you ask the Board to ignore, the fact 
remains that Mr. Hardy was outside the prison without 
permission for nearly five years, and was convicted of a new 
M a t 71. 
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felony in California during this time. The fact that the details 
of his escape are unclear is of little consequence to the 
Board's decision. 
(id. at 91). 
Subsequent to this letter, in October 1997, Hardy filed this petition for 
extraordinary relief, claiming entitlement to a new personal appearance hearing. The 
Board filed a memorandum in opposition to the petition (id. at 115). Hardy did not 
respond and the Board eventually filed a notice to submit. On September 9, 1998, the 
trial court entered a signed minute entry denying the request for extraordinary relief and 
dismissing the petition (id. at 173). Before the Board could prepare an order, however, 
Hardy moved to strike the minute entry, claiming that he had been confused by the title of 
the Board's memorandum in opposition and that he had never received the notice to 
submit for decision.3 
The trial court agreed with Hardy's argument, struck the minute entry, and gave 
the Board the opportunity to file a new responsive pleading (id. at 221). A telephonic 
conference on April 13 set a hearing date of May 24, 1999 for that responsive pleading. 
The schedule, via a minute entry, was sent to the attorneys for both parties. On April 23, 
1999, the Board filed a "motion to dismiss petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to 
rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 222). Though Hardy responded to the 
3
 Hardy asserted that he was not put on notice that denial of relief and 
dismissal of the petition was being contemplated since the Board's memo was not framed 
as either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. 
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motion, his counsel did not appear at the May 24 hearing. In an objection to the proposed 
order, Hardy's counsel claimed that he had never received the minute entry schedule and 
had not written down the hearing date. Denying the objections, the trial court granted the 
Board's motion, denied extraordinary relief, and dismissed the petition. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not consider facts outside the pleadings. The trial court 
relied solely on facts contained in the exhibits attached to the petition to analyze Hardy's 
ability to establish a claim for relief. This was a proper procedure under court rules, 
which make exhibits part and parcel of a complaint or petition. Using those exhibits did 
not constitute going outside the pleadings or deciding disputed facts, but abided fully with 
the requirements of rule 12(b)(6) to take as true the contents of the petition. 
A second, in-person, hearing was not constitutionally required. In the parole 
context, proposed procedural requirements are mandated only if they substantially further 
the accuracy and reliability of the fact-finding process. Here, the Board was not engaged 
in fact-finding. It accepted as true the expungements of the prison disciplinaries. The 
only issue before the Board was the affect those expungements should have on Hardy's 
parole status. Given the other, independent evidence of Hardy's escape and subsequent 
criminal conduct in California, a new, in-person, hearing would not have furthered the 
accuracy or reliability of the process. Even Hardy asserts only that a personal appearance 
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would have been more persuasive, not that it would have led to a better compilation of 
facts. 
Hardy is not entitled to have Labrum's due process protections applied 
prospectively. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly made this watershed case from 1993 
prospective only. Since Hardy's original parole hearing occurred in 1986 and he did not 
have a pending petition when Labrum was decided, his quest for these benefits must be 
denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS 
BASED ON FACTS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION 
AND ITS ATTACHMENTS, IT WAS NOT REQUIRED 
TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
Hardy's sole argument for reversal is that the trial court erred in deciding disputed 
facts without an evidentiary hearing. This is not correct. All the relevant facts necessary 
for decision were contained in the pleadings, i.e., the petition and its plethora of 
attachments. Under Rule 10(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, exhibits are a part of a 
pleading "for all purposes," including evaluation of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. See e.g., 
Ogden Martin Systems of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 528- 29 (7th 
Cir. 1999); ALA Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 n.8 (3rd Cir. 1994); Burns v. 
Gardner, 493 S.E.2d 356, 359 n.2 (S.C. App. 1997); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1327, at 764-65 (West 1990). Thus, not only 
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was the trial court obligated to take all the allegations in the petition as true, but it also 
was mandated to take as true the facts as spelled out in the exhibits. 
The exhibits contain facts relevant both to Hardy's claim that he was not given 
proper notice of the 1986 hearing, that the Board relied on inaccurate information, and 
that he was constitutionally entitled to a new, in-person, hearing as a result of the 
expungements. Attached to the petition are copies of letters from the Board to Hardy 
informing him of his 1986 parole hearing (R. 25, 27, 46). Though the first two letters 
refer to hearing dates eventually continued, they clearly put Hardy on notice that a parole 
hearing was upcoming. Also, though Hardy states he never received the letter of 
September 17, 1986, which informed him of the September 24 hearing, that statement is 
self-serving at best.4 
The partial transcript of the September 24, 1986 parole hearing, which Hardy also 
appended to his petition, provides further facts from which the trial court could determine 
no cognizable claim for relief. Not only did he admit the fact of escape (R. 48, 56), but 
4
 Even if Hardy's claim of ignorance could create a dispute of fact, that 
dispute is irrelevant given (1) the previous letters, which he does admit receiving, gave 
him sufficient notice that he was going to be heard; and (2) in 1986, the Board was not 
constitutionally obligated to provide any notice. Hardy's attempt to import Labrum's due 
process protections into the late 1980s cannot survive the supreme court's express 
decision not to give Labrum retroactive authority. Consequently, Hardy's "notice"claim 
is still subject to dismissal pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
because it is legally flawed under either of the potential factual landscapes. 
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he admitted committing an assault in California after the escape (R. 56-57).5 These 
admissions were not undercut by the expungement, which affected only the prison 
disciplinary, not Hardy's previous conduct. 
Hardy's substantive claim that the expungements required a personal appearance 
hearing also does not mandate an evidentiary hearing. Assuming that the question cannot 
be resolved as a matter of law, i.e., is the Board constitutionally required to grant in-
person parole hearings, in this case, the facts in Hardy's own petition show that a personal 
appearance hearing was not constitutionally required. 
Using the facts contained in those exhibits, which govern over any conflicting 
allegations in the petition, the trial court was able to avoid an evidentiary hearing. See 
GFFCorp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(when there is a dispute between allegations in a complaint and an attached exhibit, the 
exhibit controls). Hardy provided all the evidence the trial court needed to rule against 
him. In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1992) ("a plaintiff may plead himself out of 
court by attaching documents to the complaint that indicate that he or she is not entitled to 
judgment."). 
5
 These admissions are damning, regardless of Hardy's lawyerlike protests 
that his "escape" had been "blown out of proportion,"(R. 48), and his statement, "I won't 
admit to an escape but I'll admit that I left" (R. 49). 
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II. EVEN IF THE PRISON DISCIPLINARY 
EXPUNGEMENTS OBLIGED THE BOARD TO 
RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS PAROLE DECISION, 
THE SPECIAL ATTENTION REVIEW FULFILLED 
THAT OBLIGATION.6 
Before the trial court and this Court, Hardy asserts that the Department of 
Corrections' stipulation to expunge disciplinary records required that the Board nullify 
the 1986 hearing and give him a new personal appearance hearing. However, this was 
not what Hardy initially requested of the Board. Shortly after the expungement, Hardy 
wrote the Board and asked it to simply "amend" the parole decision the Board had issued 
in 1986. He did not ask for a personal appearance hearing. 
The Board, however, did re-evaluate Hardy's parole in light of the expungements 
in a "special attention review," which it held on December 14, 1993. According to the 
Board's administrative rules, special attention reviews examine special circumstances 
involving information not previously considered, but that may warrant a change in status. 
Utah Admin. Code R671-311-1 (1993).7 These reviews are based on written reports and 
do not provide for a personal appearance. Utah Admin. Code R671-311-3 (1993). 
6
 Though Hardy's failure to make any other arguments in his brief should be 
fatal to his appellate challenge, in case the Court decides to review the merits of the case, 
Points II, III, and IV address them. See Pasquin v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 
1999) ("Issues not addressed are deemed waived and abandoned."). 
7
 This rule has not changed since 1993. See Utah Admin.Code R671-311-1 
(2000). 
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Hardy argues that this review failed to afford him necessary due process. That 
argument fails because it is not in line with precedents regarding due process in parole 
hearings. "The touchstone of due process in the context of parole hearings is whether the 
proposed procedural due process requirement substantially furthers the accuracy and 
reliability of the Board's fact-finding process." Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 
(Utah 1994). Consequently, Hardy's demand for a second personal appearance hearing 
must be examined in light of this test: whether a new personal appearance hearing would 
have substantially furthered the accuracy and reliability of the Board's fact-finding 
process. 
Two decisions from Utah's appellate court's guide this examination. First, the 
high court's decision of Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 
(Utah 1997), in which an inmate asserted that due process demanded the assistance of an 
attorney to ferret out and rebut inaccurate information. The supreme court rejected 
Padilla's plea for counsel in part because he failed to state the "inaccurate information" 
upon which the Board allegedly relied. More important for this case, however, was the 
court's ruling that Padilla could not explain how an attorney would have "substantially 
furthered the accuracy and reliability of the Board's process. 
Hardy's argument is similarly flawed. He asserts that a personal appearance 
would be more persuasive. However, Utah courts have never held that due process 
requires that inmates seeking parole be given the most persuasive forum, only that the 
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process ferret out accurate and reliable facts. This said, Hardy also misapprehends the 
purpose and function of the special attention review. It is not to find facts, but to 
determine whether new facts should affect parole status. Under the precedents so far 
decided, procedural due process of the sort Hardy posits might not even apply to what is 
little more than a meeting of the individuals authorized to grant or deny parole. Given the 
Utah Supreme Court's long-established refrain that it does not sit as a panel of review, it 
is unlikely that such due process would apply. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & 
Parole, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994) (courts do not review or modify the Board's 
substantive parole decision). 
The second case that illuminates Hardy's argument and highlights its flaws also 
involved the inmate Padilla. There, a Board member who was related to Padilla's victim 
announced her conflict in front of other Board members after the personal appearance 
hearing had started. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874, 875 (Utah App. 
1992). She then left the podium, where the other members of the Board were sitting, and 
went down into the audience to sit with the victim's family. 
This is the only case where an appellate court found such an egregious violation of 
due process that it ordered a new, in-person, hearing. Id. at 876-77. This Court drew on 
supreme court precedent and declared that "due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain that we are left with the abiding impression that a 
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reasonable person would find the hearing unfair." Id. at 877 (quoting Bunnell v. 
IndustrialComm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.l (Utah 1987). 
Even assuming the truth of Hardy's allegations, the process that occurred here 
does not compare with that discussed in the first Padilla. Given the facts before the 
Board, Hardy's admission of having escaped, and the prompt special attention review 
given after Hardy requested reconsideration, there is not even an appearance of 
unfairness. 
III. BECAUSE THE BOARD HAS SOLE DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS THAT SHOULD BE 
ACCORDED DIFFERENT ITEMS OF EVIDENCE, ITS 
DECISION NOT TO CHANGE HARDY'S PAROLE 
DATE IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL SECOND-
GUESSING. 
Stripped to its essentials, Hardy's claim is nothing more than a challenge to the 
Board's parole release decision. His argument is much like the one crafted by the inmate 
in Padilla, where he asserted that "because the Board granted him the same rehearing 
date [following a judicially-mandated new original hearing], an adequate inquiry into the 
merits of his case could not have been made. 947 P.2d at 669. The Padilla court quickly 
disposed of the challenge, concluding that it would require precisely the kind of 
substantive review that it had consistently rejected. Id. 
The same is true here. The expunged disciplinaries were not the sole basis for the 
Board's apparent conclusion that an escape had occurred. In fact, the expungements only 
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excised an insignificant part of the evidence showing Hardy's detour and frolic. By far 
the most significant evidence was Hardy's own admission in the 1986 Board hearing (R. 
48, 56) that he "left" Utah prison property and was eventually found in California. This 
evidence remained securely in place after the expungements and was a sound base for the 
parole board's renewed decision to deny parole until September 14, 2004. 
Since there was evidence before the Board of an escape, it was free to conclude 
that an escape had occurred. See Walker v. State, 902 P.2d 148, 150 (Utah App. 1995) 
(concluding that, since Board's decision was "supported by evidence," the trial court 
should have deferred to its interpretation of the evidence and the weight to give it).8 
IV. HARDY'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO 
THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS ESTABLISHED 
IN LABRUM MVST FAIL BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL 
PAROLE HEARING OCCURRED BEFORE THAT 
DECISION, WHICH HAD ONLY PROSPECTIVE 
EFFECT. 
Hardy claims error by virtue of the Board's alleged failure to provide him with 
sufficient notice of his September 24, 1986 original parole hearing. He also makes 
various claims that the Board failed to provide him with information in its file before that 
hearing so that he could review and rebut it. 
Regardless of the merits of Hardy's claim, his allegations fail to establish a claim 
for relief because it runs afoul of the non-retroactivity provisions of Labrum v. Utah Bd. 
8
 This language suggests that the Board's substantive decisions could be 
reviewed and reversed only if they were completely lacking in foundation. 
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of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913 (Utah 1993). There, the supreme court for the first time 
mandated notice and disclosure in original parole grant hearings. However, the court 
declined to make that decision retroactive. "To now declare invalid each original parole 
decision held in accordance with past law would work a fundamental injustice on the 
Board, the judiciary, and the citizens of this state." Id. Hardy's hearing occurred in 1986 
and, therefore, was not subject to the notice and disclosure requirements.9 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's order denying Hardy's request for 
extraordinary relief and dismissing the petition. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION 
The Board requests oral argument and publication. This case presents two issues 
that have not previously been addressed by this Court or the Utah Supreme Court: (1) the 
use of exhibits in rule 12(b)(6) proceedings; and (2) whether in-person appearance 
hearings are constitutionally required in factual situations such as those addressed in this 
9
 Though these requirements technically were not mandated in 1986, the 
Board informed Hardy of his September 24 hearing by letter dated September 17. Again, 
this letter is attached to the petition (R. 46). Additionally, Hardy knew that an original 
parole grant hearing was coming up because it was originally scheduled for September 9 
1986 and he never disputes that he had notice of that date. 
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case. The Board believes publication of an opinion would be useful for practitioners and 
the courts and to assist in the evolution of Utah law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS^TMarch 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Orj^LMarch 2000,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
CRAIG S. COOK 
3645 E. Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
i/^/I^J/ 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 5,h Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
(801) 366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD DALE HARDY, II, 
PETITIONER, 
v. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE; 
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, Utah State 
Prison; LINDA CLARKE, Warden, 
California Training Facility, 
RESPONDENTS. 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
CASE No. 970907422 HC 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Before the Court is a request for decision filed by the respondent seeking a ruling on its 
Motion to Dismiss Hardy's petition for extraordinary relief. This case concerns the petitioner's 
request for extraordinary relief based on the Utah State Board of Pardon's alleged reliance on 
improper information at the petitioner's September 24, 1986, parole hearing. The petitioner also 
alleges that he was not given sufficient notice of the September 24, 1986 hearing, in violation of 
his due process rights. 
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(Ml * C TODQ 
JU SALT LAKE C.,.:/;Y 
Deputy Clerk 
After the reviewing the Petition, the Court found that it was not frivolous on its face and 
ordered the respondent to file a responsive pleading. After being granted an extension of time in 
which to respond, the respondent filed the Memorandum in Opposition. The petitioner did not 
reply to the respondent's Memorandum and, consequently, the Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision dismissing the petition. Counsel for petitioner moved to reopen the case, claiming that 
he had not received the notice to submit for decision. The Court, therefore, vacated the 
Memorandum Decision and the respondent was afforded the right to file a motion to dismiss, 
which it did. Counsel for petitioner filed a response but did not appear at the hearing, which had 
been scheduled during a telephonic conference with all parties. Having considered the 
allegations contained in the petition, respondent's motion to dismiss, and petitioner's reply, the 
Court denies the request for extraordinary relief and dismisses the petition for the reasons stated 
in this Order. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The petitioner plead guilty to first degree murder on September 20, 1979. On September 
28, 1979, the petitioner was sentenced to serve a life sentence in Utah State Prison. The 
petitioner escaped from the Utah State Prison on May 23,1981. Later that year, the petitioner 
was arrested in California and charged with aggravated assault and use of a firearm in the 
commission of a crime. The petitioner was convicted of that crime by a jury. 
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In February, 1986, the petitioner was released from California and returned to the Utah 
State Prison. The petitioner's original parole hearing was October 1, 1980. The rehearing was 
scheduled for September 9, 1986. This date was subsequently continued until September 24, 
1986. According to Exhibit F of the respondent's Memorandum, the petitioner was sent notice 
of the September 24, 1986 hearing on September 17,1986. Following his September 24, 1986, 
hearing, the petitioner was given a parole release date of September 14, 2004. 
On November 1, 1991, the Board of Pardons was informed that two disciplinary reports, 
concerning the petitioner's escape from prison, had been expunged. On September 7, 1993, the 
petitioner requested that his parole release date be amended on the basis that the two disciplinary 
reports had been expunged. On December 14,1993, a special attention review was conducted by 
the Board of Pardons. At the hearing, the Board of Pardons determined that the petitioner's 
parole date would not be changed. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Petition, the petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated at the 
September 24, 1986, hearing, because he was not given an adequate notice of that hearing and 
because the Board of Pardons relied on the two disciplinary reports that were subsequently 
expunged. The petitioner seeks a new hearing at which those Board members who were aware of 
the expunged records are replaced by pro tempore members. 
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Respondent sets forth several grounds for which it believes that Petition should be 
dismissed. First, the respondent contends that the petitioner has not demonstrated that his rights 
were substantially violated by the Board of Pardons' actions. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). Second, the respondent maintains that the petitioner was given 
adequate notice of the September 24, 1986, hearing. Third, the respondent contends that the 
petitioner's inadequate notice claim is subject to dismissal for untimeliness. Fourth, the 
respondent argues that the Board of Pardons could validly rely on the two disciplinary reports at 
the time of the September 24, 1986, hearing. In addition, the respondent asserts that the 
petitioner has not met his burden in demonstrating that the Board of Pardons' reliance on the two 
disciplinary reports was not only erroneous, but also harmful error. See Monson v. Carver, 928 
P.2d 1017, 1030 (Utah 1996). Finally, it is the respondent's position that the petitioner has not 
demonstrated extraordinary circumstances meriting the appointment of a pro tempore member of 
the Board of Pardons to hear his case. Utah Code Annotated §77-27-2(g) (1996). 
Having carefully considered the law and facts in this case, the Court determines that there 
is no basis to grant extraordinary relief under Rule 65B in this case. Based on the information 
before this Court, no evidence has been offered which would show that the Board of Pardons 
exceeded its jurisdiction, failed to perform an act required of law, or violated the petitioner's 
procedural due process rights. Specifically, the Court finds that the petitioner was given 
adequate notice of the September 24, 1986, hearing, as evidenced by the September 17, 1986, 
Page 4 of 7 
letter to the petitioner informing him of the September 24, 1986, hearing. Moreover, the 
petitioner's claim that he was given inadequate notice is untimely, having been brought over 
eleven years after the September, 1986, hearing. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 684. 
Additionally, the two disciplinary reports were properly before the Board of Pardons at 
the time of the September, 1986, hearing and could have been validly considered. Furthermore, 
there is nothing to suggest that the two disciplinary reports made a difference in the Board of 
Pardons' decision with respect to the petitioner's parole date. Clearly, the Board of Pardons was 
aware of the petitioner's escape from prison not only from newspaper accounts, but from the 
petitioner's own admission that he escaped. Thus, even if the Board did not have the two 
disciplinary reports before it, there was other ample evidence of the petitioner's escape. 
It further appears to this Court that, in actuality, petitioner is requesting rights that the 
Utah Supreme Court first enunciated in Labrum v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 
1993). However, that procedural guarantees set forth in that case apply only to parole hearings 
occurring after its issuance. Since petitioner's hearing took place in 1986, the Board cannot be 
faulted for failing to comply with standards that were not then in place. Id, at 911 ("To now 
declare invalid each original parole decision held in accordance with past law would work a 
fundamental injustice "). 
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Conclusion 
The request for extraordinary relief is denied and the petjjrton dismissed. 
DATED THIS<3£_j3c 1999. 
B/THE COURT 
'#v_ 
'Timothy R. Hanson 
Third District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On (0 June 1999, pursuant to rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, I 
mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this proposed order to: 
CRAIG S. COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
kkMu^^f/JMLJ^ 
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ADDENDUM B 
MEMBERS 
GARY L. WEBSTER 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
DENNIS M.FUCHS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 SOUTH 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64107 
(601)261-2817 
PAUL W. SHEFFIELD 
Administrator 
September 17, 1986 
Edward Dale Hardy USP0 14736 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Hardy: 
This is to notify you that you are scheduled for a Rehearing on Septenber 
24, 1986. You were continued for a three menber Board. Please be 
prepared to appear on die above date. 
/alk 
cc: Sharon Fronk 
MEMBERS 
GARY L. WEBSTER 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
DENNIS M.FUCHS 
~Auy % 1986 
Edward Dale Hardy, USPI14736 
P. 0, Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Exhibit 5 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 SOUTH 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64107 
(601)261-2617 
PAUL W. SHEFFIELD 
Administrator 
Dear Sir: 
Your initial Parole Grant Hearing before the Utah State Board of Pardons is 
heduled for September 9, 1986. sci 
Presently 
from ^ 
infonnation in your c 
~ sources which will used 
. the Board staff is gathering pertinent ix 
She Courts, Law Enforcement Mencie? and otherer to Divide you with ? fair hearing,. This may require that a member 
of our staff interview you prior to your scheduled Board appearance. If the 
Board determines that a pre-board interview is necessary, a date and time for 
the interview will be arranged for you through your assigned prison caseworker. 
Any written infonnation or documentation you wish the Board to consider should 









Within 14 days prior to your Hearing, you will be advised, in writing of 
the date your hearing is scheduled. 
Normally, hearings are conducted by three Board Members. 
only two members can be present. In order to be: heard b, _ 
Board, you must first sign a Waiver acknowledging that you agree to a] 
before a two-member Boan 
day of your hearing. 
_ Occasionally, 
be heard by a two-member 
The Waiver form will be available to you ar 
Hearings will be conducted at the Utah State Prison beginning at 8:30 a.m. 
VISTORS 
Board hearings are open public meetings which means anyone interested, 
including the Press will be allowed to attend. 
In order to allow the Board time enough to hear all cases on one calendar, 
only two of your vistors will be allowed to speak on your behalf, 
However, other vistors will be allowed to be present in the Hearing Room. 
On all Rehearings only one visitor will be allowed to speak on your behalf. 
Visitors under thirteen (13) years of age will not be allowed into the 
Hearing Room. 
5) The Board attempts tp hear cases with vistors during the morning hours. 
Please advise your vistors to be available at the Hearing Room no later 
than 8:30 a.m. the day of your Hearing. 
6) At the conclusion of your Hearing, you will 
in writing, of the Board's decision i^ 
inistrator 
MEMBERS 
GARY L. WEBSTER 
VICTORIA J. PALACIOS 
DENNIS M.FUCHS 
August 12, 1986 
Edward Dale Hardy, USPM736 
P. 0. Box 250o j ' Draper, Utah 84020 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOARO OF PAROONS 
6065 SOUTH 300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
(801)261-2817 




Your initial Parole Grant Hearing,before the Utah State Board of Pardons is 
scheduled for September 10, 1986 (Amended Date). 
Presently, the Board staff is gathering pertinent information in your case 
from the Courts, Law Enforcement agencies and other sources which will be,usee 
in order to provide you with ? fair hearing* This may require that a member 
of our staff interview you prior to your scheduled Board appearance. If the 
Board determines that a pre-board interview is necessary, a date and time for 
the interview will be arranged for you through your assigned prison caseworkei 
Any written information or documentation you wish the Board to consider shoulc 
be forwarded to the Board two (2) weeks in advance of your scheduled hearing. 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1) Within 14 days prior to your Hearings you will be advised, in writing of 
the date your hearing is scheduled. 
2) Normally, hearings are conducted by three Board Members. Occasionally, 
only two members can be present, in order to be heard by a two-member 
Board, you must first sign a Waiver acknowledging that you agree to appea: 
before a two-member Board. The Waiver form will be available to you the 
day of your hearing. 
3) Hearings will be conducted at the Utah State Prison beginning at 8:30 a.m. 
VISTORS 
1) Board hearings are open public meetings which means anyone interested, 
including the Press will be allowed to attend. 
2) In order to allow the Board time enough to hear all cases on one calendar 
only two of your.vistors will be allowed to speak on your behalf, 
However, other vis tors will be allowed to be present in the Hearing Room. 
3) On all Rehearings only one visitor will be allowed to speak on your behali 
4) Visitors under thirteen (13) years of age will not be allowed into the 
Hearing Room. 
5) The Board attempts to hear cases with vistors during the morning hours. 
Please advise your vistors to be available at the Hearing Room no later 
than 8:30 a.m. the day of your Hearing. 
6) At the conclusion of your Hearing, 
in writing, of the Board's decie,A 
imstrator 
EDWARD DALE HARDY - #14736 
REHEARING: 9-24-86 
WEBSTER: Good morning. The time set for the, actually for rehearing in the 
case of Edward Dale Hardy, USV14736, is that right? Sir, I ask you 
to answer out loud. 
HARDY: All right. 
WEBSTER: The mike needs to pick up, okay. You were sentenced here for the 
crime of criminal homicide, it's a capital offense with a live 
sentence. Is that correct? 
HARDY: Yes. 
WEBSTER: And you were first committed here in October of 1979 and at your 
original hearing you were given a rehearing for last October of 1985. 
In the interim, after you served about 18 months, apparently there 
was an escape involving taking an officer in maximum security 
(inaudible), you left and had been incarcerated in the California 
prison system during the interim period, is that correct? 
HARDY: Uh, I was in California, yes. As far as the elements surrounding this 
escape, it's been blown out of proportion as my memory recollects. 
WEBSTER: Well, the information we have, and I have your disciplinary report 
here, uh, that you were heard on, I understand, for some reason it 
was dismissed with the, it was overruled and there is a conviction for 
the escape and we have the reports on the escape and I am repeating 
to you the report as we have them, and giving you an opportunity to. 
. . I notice in your application or on your board report you do not 
acknowledge the escape took place. But the fact remains that you 
left this institution and were gone for some 57 months or something 
to that effect. Do you want to comment on it? 
HARDY: I was never given a hearing on this write-up here. I went, asked for a 
dismissal, it was dismissed, it was never discussed there. I was 
given no notice of Captain House's appeal on that. That hearing was 
held without me. 
WEBSTER: Okay, well this Board is not going to get into the internal working of 
the disciplinary process here because we are going to, I think, note 
that the escape, that it took place, you were not here in this 
institution as per sentence, for some period of time, and the record 
tells us that you were incarcerated in the California prison system for 
the interim period. Do you want to acknowledge that? Fine, you 
can acknowledge it, if not we can maybe play some word games 
about it. 
HARDY: No, listen Fm not playing word games, what I said, or what I was 
trying to express is the elements surrounding that escape never took 
place. The elements . . . 
WEBSTER: You're not saying—you're saying the manner in which 
HARDY: Right. 
WEBSTER: the hostage denied the change of clothes, the taking of the officer 
with you in his car didn't take place. 
HARDY: No, no. 
WEBSTER: Okay. Do you want to offer an explanation at this point to the 
Board? Your version. 
HARDY: Uh, what of this right here? The escape? Uh, there was no hostage 
taken, there was no weapon used, and that was never proven really. 
The hearing was held without me, I won't admit to an escape but Fll 
admit that I left. I didn't leave in that manner of what they said. 
WEBSTER: Okay. Uh, previous day, we'll go back, regarding the crime for 
which you're here, Fm just going to briefly serve the audible record. 
I think that your prior hearing, the detail of the crime that brought 
you here, was discussed, but this basically was a shooting of the 
victim outside a bar apparently during a drug deal, and we do have 
your comments in your application indicating that you feel like the 
plea bargain and the life sentence is unjust. That it was not a capital 
offense, but nonetheless you were charged, there were multiple 
charges and I guess you pled to the capital rather than go to trial 
because of the other charges pending. 
HARDY: Yes. 
WEBSTER: I did have one question. There was an attempted homicide pending 
in Salt Lake, what was that? 
HARDY: I was never charged with that 
WEBSTER: An attempted criminal homicide in Salt Lake County? 
HARDY: No, the only charges I had in Salt Lake County regarding that whole 
thing there, that's why I maintained that I was duped into pleading 
guilty. I was charged with the three gun thefts in Salt Lake County. 
WEBSTER: Okay. 
HARDY: The record will reflect that, but on the expiation agreement they said 
I was charged with a burglary, attempted criminal burglary 
WEBSTER: Yeah, that's what I had read here in your record, is the nature of 
your plea bargain. I've read that. 
HARDY: Right, the nature of the plea bargain had that on there but the arrest 
report and the arraignment, I was only arraigned for the three gun 
thefts and an auto theft out of Davis County. 
WEBSTER: Excuse me, that's, you know that's 
HARDY: My co-defendant in that was charged with the attempted criminal 
homicide and burglary. I wasn't charged with that, but they used 
that in the expiation agreement. I didn't find out until years later. 
WEBSTER: Okay. Uh, you know, because of the escape and the situation in 
California, your case seems to be complicating itself rather than 
straightening itself out. Uh, we don't have much of a record to go on 
since your return to California—we do have an Information from the 
California prison system regarding some of your adjustments, etc. 
down there. Is the Board, or the institution here in anticipation that 
the Board would move forward with the last October 1985 rehearing 
attempted to secure information. Se we do have that down there. A 
couple of things that I just wanted to point out in that record. One is 
that I think you were first in Fulsome and then in San Quentin? Is 
that 
HARDY: No, I was in San Quentin first and then transferred to Fulsome. 
WEBSTER: Okay. You did get your GED while you were down there— 
HARDY: High school in San Quentin and GED in Fulsome. 
WEBSTER: Okay, well good because I wasn't picking up on the high school. 
Uh, there was some indication that you had had your fair share of 
some disciplinary record down there as well. 
HARDY: Four I believe, 
WEBSTER: Urn hum, 
HARDY: Or three, there was three disciplinary on that report there from Mr. 
Chikirpa(?). There is a thing in there about assaulting an inmate, ah, 
I was taken to the hole for twelve days for an investigation. They 
rolled up about twenty of us and they put us all loose except for two 
guys. You know that was not part of a disciplinary, I was taking the 
max for that, for an investigation along with other people, but 
WEBSTER: Did you work while you were in the California system? 
HARDY: The whole time, yes. 
WEBSTER: What was your work assignment? 
HARDY: I was working on the yard crew. 
WEBSTER: Okay, landscaping? 
HARDY: Yeah. 
WEBSTER: Cleaning, things like that. Okay, one thing I noticed in your 
background, Fm switching back and forth now, out of the prison 
adjustment; I noticed in your background that you have what I would 
describe as an outstanding record in the military. Several awards 
and everything; and your criminal history looks like it really started 
almost as a consequence of your involvement in the Vietnam thing. 
HARDY: That's what I believe, I've never used that as a cop-out, 
WEBSTER: Your drug dependency and affiliation with drugs started I guess then 
and carried on into your civilian life after your discharge? 
HARDY: Uh, no, I wasn't using drugs when I first got back, I was drinking 
pretty heavy and 
WEBSTER: I used that interchangeable 
HARDY: And then after a couple of years after I came back, I started getting 
back into drugs again. 
WEBSTER: Okay. Uh, back to this original crime, the one for which you're 
here. How heavily were you involved in dealing? 
HARDY: Pardon me. 
WEBSTER: How heavily were you involved in dealing? This was particularly a 
drug deal gone bad? 
HARDY: Uh, I never really was into dealing drugs. What happened this night 
was a friend of a friend, I knew the guy but he was more of a friend 
to a friend of mine—had some marijuana he wanted to sell, asked if I 
knew anybody, I made a few calls and this Kurt Cordary(?), uh, he 
was a friend of a friend of mine, I had no financial interest in it or 
nothing—I was doing a friend a favor,, just hooking something up 
for guy and I went along with them. The thing was I robbed this 
guy's dope connection a couple of days earlier, Kurt Cordary's drug 
connection, and while I was calling on the phone setting this thing 
up for these people, I was told that Kurt Cordary was paid to kill me 
for robbing his dope connection and that I should bring a gun. I was 
pretty loaded that night too. And I told the guy that was with me 
what was happening, he says then tell them we're not even going to 
go, so I told the guy over the phone and I let myself get talked into 
going. He talked me into taking a gun over the phone, I took the gun 
there 
WEBSTER: That was a shotgun? 
HARDY: Yeah. And the guy pulled a gun on me, I know there was no gun 
ever found, but the guy did pull a gun on me. I didn't mean to shoot 
him, I meant to pump the shotgun, I didn't even know it was loaded 
at first. The gun was just handed to me when I was sitting in the car 
and I went to pump the shotgun and it went off. 
WEBSTER: Uh, let's just turn now to your adjustment since you've been back. 
You've been back here since March I believe? 
HARDY: About six months. 
WEBSTER: About six months. Uh, I haven't had a chance to go through your 
prison record, I did take a look at and asked the institution to provide 
the Board with the documents regarding the disciplinary finding on 
the escape. I did that because of your comments not acknowledging 
it. Have you had any other convictions in a disciplinary? 
HARDY: Uh, I was found not guilty of bars being cut on my cell, and that was 
reversed also to guilty without my knowledge or without providing 
me a hearing, and I got a write-up 
WEBSTER: How long, let's just stop. I want to talk with you, this is the 
maximum when all the bars were found cut? 
HARDY: No, this was about two months ago, back in July. 
WEBSTER: Okay, were you the only one that was written up for having bars cut? 
HARDY: No, there were three people. 
WEBSTER: Okay, this is the one I think that hit the news media, that I have 
HARDY: I believe so, I think it was in the news, 
WEBSTER: Uh, yeah that was reversed? How long had you been living in that 
cell? 
HARDY: About six weeks, I guess. 
WEBSTER: Six weeks. Uh, seems like a pointless question, but did you know 
the bars were cut? 
HARDY: No. No there were three sets of bars cut, I was the only one found 
guilty. One guy was never heard, he's the one who admitted to 
cutting my bars because he had lived in there a couple of months 
before I moved in, and he admitted to cutting other bars and they 
found that guy not guilty. The guy who admitted it was never heard 
on his write-up. I was found not guilty and then it was reversed. 
WEBSTER: That was reversed? Okay. You said there was another disciplinary 
conviction? I cut you off because I want to talk about that. 
HARDY: Yeah, that was for passing legal material. We're not supposed to 
pass anything over there. I was passing legal material to some other 
inmates and I got a write-up for it. 
WEBSTER: And what was the disposition? 
HARDY: Guilty on passing legal material. I was written up for yelling and 
threatening, which I never did. I was found not guilty of that but 
found guilty of passing legal material. 
WEBSTER: Okay. That's the one, I did look at your prison file and noticed that 
report and didn't get a chance to get a complete reading. 
HARDY: I spoke with Mr. Robinson yesterday to clarify the write-up that 
came back. The photocopy didn't say nothing about the passing of 
legal work, it just said the 26. And I asked them 
about it and that's an act that threatens the security of the institution. 
WEBSTER: Okay. And you don't have any visitors here with you, but the 
reports tell us that you do have a very supportive support system 
should you be granted a release date. 
HARDY: I have a very supportive family. 
WEBSTER: You have a wife and a child, 
HARDY: Two boys 
WEBSTER: Two? Okay, for some reason I thought there was just one. They are 
living in California? 
HARDY: Yes. 
WEBSTER: And your wife apparently owns her own business according to the 
information we have, also, and this is new in the record, are you, you 
are apparently a partner in a trucking firm? 
HARDY: Yes. I have been for years. I believe I said that the last time I was 
here. 
WEBSTER: Okay. I didn't pick that up, it came to my attention later on in the 
file material, it may have been. That would be your source of 
income, is the trucking firm? 
HARDY: Since I've been out there 
WEBSTER: Do you take an active part in the management of that firm now, or 
are you taking a passive that you're in prison, this is the situation? 
HARDY: Yeah, I can't work, I've got no income coming from it. It's set up 
like that. 
WEBSTER: Is there a joint ownership or something? 
HARDY: Yeah, my father owns 51% and I own 49%. 
WEBSTER: Okay, all right. I'm not going to, I don't think that I have any further 
questions just let me look at my other notes here in going through 
your record. The only other question that I have, it looks like I know 
that you're not happy about being in prison, I know that you feel like 
this sentence of life is not fair and all, but it looks like to me you're 
continuing to try and resist and fight the system with the 
disciplinaries and all. I'm wondering if you want to comment on 
that? 
HARDY: Uh, these last two disciplinaries as far as the bars and this passing of 
legal materials, the legal material I'll always pass regardless of 
whether it's against the rules or not. If a guy needs help and I can 
help him out, I'm going to do it. I don't see anything threatening to 
the security of the institution. As far as cutting the bars, I didn't do 
that, I was found not guilty. I have my own beliefs as to why all this 
stuff has happened as far as the write-ups. I've questioned Captain 
House until I got my first write-up about why I was in max, what 
evidence. And he's always stated, he didn't need evidence, he could 
house me there. Right about four days after I asked that question the 
first time is when he wrote this up here. And I believe it's a 
conspiracy by Captain House. I may be paranoia but I truly believe 
that Captain House is just trying to accumulate evidence in order to 
keep me over there. 
WEBSTER: Okay, then let me turn to the other board members and see if they 
have some questions. 
HARDY: Okay. 
WEBSTER: Ms.Placeos 
PLACEOS: I just have one question Mr. Hardy. Um, you, it goes to the escape. 
You have no new conviction, you have no disciplinary convictions 
that I can see or acknowledge, but at the same time we have what I 
think you are acknowledging and that is a prima facie case of escape. 
You were in custody, you had no legal order to be out of custody, 
and you ended up out of custody. 
HARDY: Yes. 
PLACEOS: Now, we have a report, a rather detailed report that tells us about all 
of the things that you did. That's the only information we have. If 
you would have us believe that Scotty beamed you outside those 
walls, that's fine. But if you would prepare, to present to us an 
explanation of how you got outside the walls, I'd be happy to hear it. 
Otherwise all I have is the report that I've got. 
HARDY: No, I'd rather not comment. 
PLACEOS: That's fine. I have nothing further. 
FUCHS: Mr. Hardy, I guess my main concern is, um, there was a murder that 
occurred here, and then you end up in California after leaving the 
institution by whatever means occurred, then you end up in 
California being arrested again for a sawed-off shotgun, you were 
using that in the commission of a crime and that kind of concerns 
me. How come you get out of here and kind of basically start the 
same kind of behavior again in California? 
HARDY: Circumstances were a little bit different. Uh, I didn't really use the 
shotgun, there was one there, I didn't use it. What happened in 
California was basically a fist fight. There was no burglary in the 
larcenous sense. I'd been living at that house, paying rent there. I'd 
babysat earlier that day and this guy and this girl, they were 
boyfriend and girlfriend lived together. The girl had a four-year old 
boy I was babysitting him earlier that same day. And we was out on 
the front porch and he was riding his little big wheel around. This 
was in July so I told him, why don't you take your shirt off, if s 
kinda hot. He took his shirt off and he was full of bruises and I 
asked him what happened. He told me his dad hits him, his mom's 
boyfriend. Well, I was mad about that. That's the main thing why I 
went, why I beat the guy up so bad. I hit him with my fists, my 
hand's still messed up, I broke my hand. As far as the use of the gun 
I didn't use the gun, there was one there but there was not one used. 
FUCHS: Was it your gun? 
HARDY: No, 
FUCHS: It was just in the house you claim? 
HARDY: No, it was borrowed from somebody. 
FUCHS: Well, I appreciate that explanation, thank you. 
WEBSTER: Anything further? 
FUCHS: No. 
WEBSTER: Mr. Hardy, one of the things that I, in the earlier part of the hearing 
that I did not mention, is that there is correspondence in the file, very 
supportive correspondence giving us some greater appreciation, I 
guess, for your relationship with your wife and family. Very 
supportive and it looks like you have, as I said earlier, a good 
support system out there. We do have letters in the file updating us 
and telling us of that relationship. Uh, the Board's guidelines that 
we use, both the old guidelines and the time period reference so I 
can't tell you that the guidelines suggest you service "X" number of 
years or whatever because they don't address that issue. Do you 
have anything that you would like to say before we close the 
hearing? 
HARDY: Uh, after your decision is there any chance of you recommending I 
be sent back to California? 
WEBSTER: Okay, uh, the thing that I would tell you is that it looks like you have 
your family and your support system there and the responsibility for 
working out a compact of inmate transfers between the two prison 
systems is not the Boards', I don't think this Board would have any 
objection though to you compacting as an inmate to California where 
your support system is. 
HARDY: I've been asking since I've been back and getting ignored about the 
whole thing. I've asked to either go to a federal system where they 
have that delayed stress program or back to California. I just get 
ignored. 
WEBSTER: Well, uh, we have an institutional representative here, and she's 
heard this part of the hearing and I would consider that it's 
something that she is in a position to follow up on. Do you have 
anything further, if not we'll ask you to step off. 
WEBSTER: Okay, Mr. Hardy, the Board's decision is to grant a parole but it will 
be sometime off. We debated whether or not to grant another 
rehearing and after discussion we felt that to give you a full date 
right up front and tell you that you can apply for redeterminations 
and possibly have an opportunity to change that, you know, it's up to 
you. But the date is after your service of a total of twenty years, 
actually 18 years from now. Eighteen years from now, that is 
September 14, 2004. It will be the total service of twenty years, we 
are not granting credit for the time in custody in California. Okay? 
HARDY: All right. 
WEBSTER: Thank you. 
Exhibit 13 
Edward Dale Hardy II 
H-11980. 
P.O. Box 600 
Tracy, Calif. 95378-0600 
Honorable Members of the Board, 
On September 24,1986, I appeared before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons, at which time I was granted a release date of September 
14,2004. 
During the course of that hearing, several references were 
made to information contained in two seperate Utah State Prison In-
mate Disciplinary Reports, to which I made several attempts to expl-
ain that the accusations and results contained in the Disciplinary 
Reports were incorrect, untrue, and illegally determined. 
I subsequently pursued my contentions and position in that 
regard, and ultimately obtained an Expungment Order of the Discipli-
nary Reports. 
It is my sincere belief that the majority of weight and con-
sideration given toward deciding my release date, was based on the 
information that has since been expunged, and I respectfully submit 
that the record supports my belief. 
With the foregoing in mind, I respectfully and humbly pray 
that, without being statutorily assessed for a re-determination un-
der provisions of the Utah Code, The Honorable Members of the Board 
of Pardons please amend, in light of the expungment, it's previous 
descision of September 24,1986 regarding my release. 
I am presently serving the remainder of my Utah sentence in 
the California Department of Corrections under provisions of the 
Utah State Board of Pardons 
488 East 6400 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 a/l-^  
Interstate Corrections Compact, and can be contacted by mail at; 
Edward Hardy, H-11980 
P.O. Box 600 
Tracy, Calif. 95378-0600 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Note: I've enclosed for the Board's convenience, A certified trans-
cript of my September 24,1986 appearance before the Board, with ref-
erences to the expunged information in highlight, aswell as the Cer-
tificate of Expungment and related letter from Director Deland. 
Exhibit 14 
Januarv 22,1994 
Dear Mr. Sibbett, 
On 1/21/94, I received from you, a "Before the Board of Pardons of th 
State of Utah" form dated 12/14/93, which contained extremely vague results of 
a " Special Attention Review " that you conducted regarding my Utah sentence. 
I have never written to you, or any other Board member indicating thai 
I would like a Special Attention review of my sentence, and I do not feel that 
I should be penalized and assessed for one. 
My 9/7/93 letter to the Board specifically asked that my sentence be 
:orrected due to the mistake made by the Board regarding information it had re-
luested to be created, for use against me at my 9/24/86 re-hearing. (Please ref 
:o the transcript that I sent you in my 9/7/93 letter). I asked that my sentenc 
>e amended in light of and only in light of the Expungment Order issued by Judg 
>"kins. 
I had made my request based on Chairman Pete Haunfs assurance that par* 
le decisions are not based on allegations or aquittals, and that once informat: 
s found to be erroneous, I could ask for a second hearing. Please read the Aug-
st 12,1990 Salt Lake Tribune article of an interview with Mr. Haun that I've er 
losed. 
A new and second hearing to nullify the old, and mistakenly conducted 
Lrst hearing is what I had requested, so that my parole date couJ.d be corrected 
lis I swear to under penalty of perjury. 
Also in my 9/7/93 letter, I specifically requested that I not be pena-
zed or assessed for a determination under the provisions of Utah. The same 
ovision which Special Attention reviews are Catergorized under. 
If my intent was to be given a " Special Attention Review" I'd have pre 
"ted an extensive, thorough and extremely detailed documentation and analysis 
my many program and work accomplishments, as well as my personal family tra-
under penalty of perjury. 
These types of circumstances are what is to preceed information 
previously considered, when applying for Special Attention. Please refer to 
Redeterminations/Special Attentions policy and procedures. 
There's no way that I would have requested a M Special Attention 
Review" with only information not previously considered, without also citing 
the circumstances that are required to preceed it. This fact I also swear to 
under penalty of perjury. 
With the foregoing in mind, I respectfully request that you plea 
and forthwith, vacate, nullify and void the 12/14/93 M Special Attention Rev 
that you have conducted and penalized me for? 
If you have honestly and sincerely interpreted my 9/7/93 letter 
and my present request to be a request for a " Special Attention Review"of m 
sentence, would you at least please and forthwith mail to me at my enclosed 
ess, a detailed, appropriate and adequate, written statement of the reasons 
explinations for your 12/14/93 descision, including, but not limited to, the 
following? 
1. The nature and contents of, any and all uses of and referenc 
to, reports, recommendations, disciplinaries, conversations and summaries th 
you relied on in making your descision, stating the sources that originally 
ated them. 
2. The names of any and all persons who were authors of, partie 
or'references in, any and all reports, recommendations, disciplinaries, conv 
sations and summaries that you relied on in making your descision. 
3.Whether or not any and all of the information that you relied 
in making your descision was verified by you, or any of your peers and/or su 
Unates to be tru§ correct, legal and legitimate, and not ordered to be expu 
by any court. 
contained in Utah State Prison Inmate Disciplinary Reports # 2620 and // 2681. 
T* *>t, please explain in detail how you verified the fact. 
5. Whether or not the sources that originally created, any and all of 
:he information that you relied on in making your descision can verify that the 
.nformation is, presently in their files on a legitimate basis, or in conflict 
ith any court's order of expungment. 
6. Whether or not any and all of the Information that you relied on ii 
aking your descision was based on events occuring prior to 8/24/90. If yes, pie 
tate what the events were, and when they occured. 
7. Any and all reasons, explinations, information and justifications 
lat are the cause for my service of sentence being nearly twice as long as sev-
al other Utah State prisoners who have been convicted of the same offense as I 
s, and whose case factors are of a much more serious and heinous nature than 
ne. Please refer to the enclosed Salt Lake Tribune article regarding Kenneth 
Stanrod, for just one example. 
Please inform me by writing me at my enclosed address, as soon as poss 
Le, for any costs that I may be required to pay for the written results of your 




Edward Dale Hardy II 
H-11980 
P.O. Box 600 
Tracy, Calif. 95378-0600 
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State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Tel (801) 261-6464 
Fax (801) 261-6481 
February 28, 1994 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Govenor 
Michael R. Sibbitt 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
H. L. (Pete) Haun 
Curtis L. Garner 
Cheryl Hansen 
Members 
Edward Hardy, USP# 14736 
H-11890 
P.O. Box 600 
Tracy, CA. 95378-0600 
Dear Mr. Hardy: 
This letter is in response to your two letters received in 
January and February 1994. I will attempt to explain the results 
of your Special Attention Hearing that was conducted on December 
14, 1993. The basic issue is that during your Rehearing in 
September of 1986, the Board had access to two disciplinary 
reports, the question is that this information was expunged and 
could the Board in fact use this information to make a decision 
which ultimately resulted in your September 14, 2004, parole 
date. IN a consultation with the Attorney General's office, it 
was concluded that the hearing in 1986 was held before the 
expungement order and hence, according to the Attorney General's 
Office does not need to be considered. The Board then made the 
ultimate decision not to change your September 14, 2004 parole 
date. 
You ask additional questions regarding information in your file 
and its verification. Generally speaking the Board receives 
information from the Department of Corrections and through 
Presentence Investigations, etc. That information is 
confidential. You can receive the information relative to the 
GRAMA Act by requesting that information directly from the Board. 
The Board will not at this time simply give you your Board file. 
There has been a recent Supreme Court decision referred to as the 
Labrum Decision, in which we do disclose file material. Due to 
the fact that you have no upcoming Rehearing scheduled, you will 
not receive that file material. The law only applies to people 
who are coming for Original Hearings or Rehearings after December 
1993. 
Again, you need to request yo"r file material through the 
appropriate channels here at the Board of fardons. 
Respectfully, 94 ^ 
Paul Larsen 
Hearing Officer 
A ili if 
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Staie of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
448 East 6400 South • Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Tel (801) 261-6464 
Fax (801) 261-6481 
May 16,1995 
Edward D.Hardy, #11980 
P.O. Box 2210 
Susanville, CA. 96130 
Dear Mr. Hardy: 
Your correspondence of April 5,1995 has been forwarded to me for a response. You ask in that 
correspondence that your September 24,1986 re-hearing be vacated, nullified and voided so that 
your parole date can be corrected and reduced. You site as reason for this request 5 separate 
issues which you believe should be dealt with by the Board of Pardons. In reviewing your file, I 
noted that several of the issues have already been addressed by other individuals and therefor will 
not be addressed in this response. 
Issue number 3 however, does not appear to have been addressed earlier. I did review your file 
and found the four attached documents, all of which give you prior written notice and 
instructions for your scheduled September 24,1986 hearing before a full 3 member Board of 
Pardons. 
Given that your new allegation, #3, has proven itself to be without merit and other allegations 
were addressed in earlier correspondence, I can see no reason for granting your request that your 
September 24,1986 re-hearing be "nullified and voided." 
Sincerely, 
David R. Franchina 
Hearing Officer 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Michael R. Sibbett 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
HJL (Pete) Hann 





Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Michael R. Sibbett 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
H.L. (Pete) Haun 




BOARD Oi PARDONS AND PAROLE 
E x h i b i t 18 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Tel (801) 261-6464 
Fax (801) 261-6481 
May 6, 1996 
Craig Stephens Cook 
Attorney at Law 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
The Board has received, from the Attorney General's Office, a copy of your request on 
behalf of Edward Dale Hardy for reconsideration and a rehearing of Mr. Hardy's case. The Board 
has thoroughly reviewed the document, in which you provided legal counsel, and finds nothing in 
it to warrant reconsideration of Mr. Hardy's case or the granting of a shorter parole date. 
Even disregarding the disciplinary reports surrounding the 1981 escape, which you ask the 
Board to ignore, the fact remains that Mr. Hardy was outside the prison without permission for 
nearly five years, and was convicted of a new felony in California during this time. The fact that 
the details of his escape are unclear is of little consequence to the Board's decision. 
If there was a lack of proper notice of Mr. Hardy's 1986 Board hearing, and if you allege 
that it impaired his ability to offer information, we invite you, and he, to share such information in 
writing with the Board now. Presumably, you have done so in your letter. The only apparent 
"fact" that is new to us, however, is your speculation that Mr. Hardy's criminality was caused by 
or related to exposure to Agent Orange or the trauma of his Vietnam experience. Considering his 
history and the seriousness of Mr. Hardy's crimes, this speculation is too insubstantial to merit 
reconsideration of his current date. 
As for your assertion that Mr. Hardy should be given credit for time served on escape from 
Utah and serving time in California, we know of no authority for this position. 
Finally, any additional information you have offered is too insubstantial to merit 




Michael R. Sibbett 
Chairman 
